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24 Gary A Ian Scott 
Setting Free the Boys: 
Limits and Liberation in Plato's Lysis 
By Gary Alan Scott 
Duquesne University 
Plato's Lysis illustrates how latent limits function as a practical determinant 
of identity before they are ever manifest philosophically. The Lysis locates these 
implicit boundaries at the threshold of self-knowledge, revealing how, in the do-
main of character, limits are the analog of philosophical presuppositions. The 
connection between the latent boundaries of identity and philosophical presuppo-
sitions becomes problematic whenever character limits tether common- sense to 
unexamined principles. This paper' examines how Socrates' erotic method works 
in the Lysis and explores, more generally, the ability Socrates has to engender a 
positive transformation in his interlocutors. Socrates seems to display a unique 
capacity first for detecting and then for disclosing the blind-spot in his interlocutor's 
character that often undermines a straightforward acceptance of their argument. 
In the most extreme cases, such as with Meno and Callicles, Socrates seizes 
upon such a performative contradiction to attempt to spark their heightened self-
awareness. But the remedy offered by Socrates' disclosure produces a wide vari-
ety of results in those with whom he converses. Many times, Socrates is not 
successful in effecting a change in them. Meno, for example, proves to be practi-
cally unteachable because he never acknowledges that he has anything to learn. 
His conceit of wisdom precludes him from any real learning. Callicles cannot 
maintain a friendly disposition toward Socrates as long as he clings t~ his desire to 
win the argument. He must either drop the veil of friendliness or abandon the 
attempt to dominate Socrates.2 Nor would it seem that Socrates was successful in 
his counsels to Charmides and Alcibiades, if we can surmise anything from their 
subsequent political careers.3 The Lysis, however, offers a positive example of the 
Socratic method and substantiates the effectiveness of his erotic strategy toward 
young Athenian boys. At least one of the two main characters appears to benefit 
greatly from Socrates' intervention. For this reason alone, the Lysis deserves close 
attention. 
Socrates typically provokes the unwitting disclosure of his interlocutor's char-
acter flaw through a volatile combination of arousal and humiliation. These two 
disconcerting components comprise the critical dynamic of Socrates' erotic method 
of practicing philosophy. One side of this erotic method fans the flames of his 
auditor's passions to heights unimaginable without Socrates' intervention while 
, 
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the other side undermines the possibility of acting on the grandiose desires once 
they are awakened. Nowhere is this admixture of incendiary arousal and whole-
sale humbling set in greater relief than in Socrates' first exchange with Lysis.4 
Perhaps no other context allows the positive effect produced by his tactics to be 
seen so clearly. By examining his approach to Lysis in this essay, it will be pos-
sible to differentiate Socrates' method of erotic exchange from other forms of ex-
change, e.g. pederastic, economic, and political. 
It is illuminating to explore the way that in the Lysis Socrates' two-pronged 
method accomplishes the profound and particular disclosure of identity through a 
subtle delineation of Lysis' limits. This focus upon limits accords with Socrates' 
general strategy of exposing some deficiency in the interlocutor that sabotages 
fulfillment of his aspirations. With Lysis, as with others, Socrates attempts to 
provide a certain kind of knowledge, the most important aspect of which is not 
abstract, theoretical knowledge but a highly particular, highly personal self-knowl-
edge. Through evincing what may perhaps be called his "tragic flaw" ,6 Socrates 
has a remedial effect on Lysis. He awakens in Lysis both the desire to know and 
the possibility for greater self-sufficiency (autarkeia).1 Socrates serves as a mirror 
to Lysis, offering him an almost uncanny, reflexive access to his own identity. 
In the Lysis , Socrates not only inflames Lysis' passions, provoking his desire 
for knowledge; the way he combines this arousal with a powerful humbling fo-
ments the possibility for a genuine liberation. Concentrating upon these two em-
blematic features of Socrates' method may be propitious for understanding Socrates' 
seeming seduction ofLysis in the dialogue. This investigation should yield greater 
insight into the nature of Socratic seduction in general. It seeks to discover whether 
or not Socrates seduces his interlocutors into thinking that their best hope of at-
taining wisdom and freedom depends upon further association with him. Some 
form of seduction surely occurs with the noble, beautiful, and very young Lysis. 8 
Yet the qualms to which Socrates confesses after his presumptive "capture" of the 
boy (at 218c) indicates perhaps that Socrates knows he is overstating his case and 
that his thinly veiled hubris9 may have led him to exaggerate his efficacy. 10 
Framed as the enigmatic paragon of the Lysis, Socrates may turn out to be-
queath something invaluable to his interlocutors, something that galvanizes them 
and unlocks their potential for self-sufficiency. The Lysis demonstrates the degree 
to which the Socratic method culminates in the kind of "loosing" or "setting-free" 
its title connotes. 11 This vastly unappreciated dialogue depicts the dynamics of 
such a "loosing" under the beguiling Eros of the Socratic method. Understood as 
a setting-free, Socrates' erotic approach to Lysis not only looses in him a desire to 
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know; it fundamentally empowers him. Socrates' greatest gift to his interlocutors 
may then tum out to be less a body of knowledge than the empowerment of their 
freedom, spawned by interaction with him. 12 Freedom (e/eutheria), here, takes 
the form of the extreme self-mastery Socrates exemplifies through his vexing be-
havior in Plato's dialogues. That the awakening of his freedom summons Lysis 
from passivity to activity will be one of its most important effects. The example of 
the indomitable Socrates teaches that knowledge, as· particular self-knowledge, 
and freedom, as self-sufficiency, are thoroughly interwoven. 
II 
II 
Previous commentators have not clarified how the Lysis outlines the connec- II 
tion between limits and liberation. 13 As the dialogue unfolds, Socrates looses the 
sovereignty of unexpressed, undisclosed boundaries and points the way to self-
sufficiency. Conceived as ardent self-sufficiency rather than emancipation from 
all limitations, Socratic setting-free involves the shift to a perspective that grasps 
the natural boundaries inherent in things. It distinguishes such limits from an act 
of subjugation, recognizing that limits are not simply impositions of authority 
upon individuals but what forms and shapes individuals qua individuals. Byun-
earthing the connection between limits and liberation, and differentiating ex.'ternal 
from intrinsic limits, the Lysis discloses the way limits as such contribute to the 
formation of identity. Its hypothetical bracketing14 of all external constraints per-
mits intrinsic limits to become one of the dialogue's conspicuous themes. 
Step One: Problematizing the Familiar 
In their first exchange (206e3-211 b5), Socrates exposes Lysis' trust. 15 It will 
become apparent how the issue of limits arises through the course of Socrates' 
questioning. Lysis must'be delivered from his trust before his present limits can 
be uncovered and he can be aroused from his complacency. Through his system-
atic query, Socrates shifts the emphasis from conventional limits that constrain 
extrinsically to natural limits that intrinsically restrain. Knowledge of any art or 
skill will demand such a shift in understanding. So will the application of the 
Socratic method if it is to be successful in making apparent to Lysis something 
pivotal about his identity. He shows Lysis that there are many kinds of bound-
aries, some of which, like illiteracy, emanate from the individual and some of 
which, like the laws governing the age of majority, do not. 
Socrates' method demonstrates one sense of the "loosing" signified by Lysis' 
name. The first answer to the question, "Who or what is being loosed in the 
Lysis?" must include the surreptitious limits that Lysis takes for granted. It is 
precisely this loosing from latent trust in the familiar, through the hyperbolic oc-
clusion of various kinds of constraints, that is the aim of Socrates' careful 
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problematization of established authority: familial, political, religious, poetic, sexual 
and philosophical. Notice how differently Socrates behaves with Lysis than he 
does during the adversarial contest he initiates with Menexenus. Their respective 
propensities to trust certain things necessitates his different formulae for the two 
boys. Whereas Lysis trusts traditional authorities 16-his parents, his religion, his 
city, and the poets-Menexenus relies too heavily upon argumentation, especially 
arguments of the eristic kind notorious among the Sophists. 17 Socrates harnesses 
their proclivity to rely upon something familiar as the Archimedean point of his 
approach to each of the boys. 
The way Socrates tailors his tactics to the unique character of the two boys 
suggests that each of us trusts most our own fundamental beliefs and that these 
beliefs readily intertwine with our philosophical standpoints. Perhaps these fun-
damental beliefs predispose each of us to take for granted certain behaviors, per-
sons and arguments. In this sense, reliance upon the familiar characterizes not 
only the act of trusting but also the fulcrum for that trust which underlies such 
acts, disposing each of us to trust what we do. Even though Plato does not use the 
word pis tis (trust) in the Lysis, the dialogue delineates three levels of trust while 
evidencing important ways that trust is a necessary precondition for any act of 
placing one's affairs in the hands of another. 18 It is the subtle dominion of a more 
stealthy kind of trust that places covert limits upon the two boys. It is from these 
implicit limits that Socrates attempts to emancipate Lysis. Lysis needs to be cut 
loose from his customary moorings because, in his present circumstances, his 
reliance upon familiar authority governs him much more profoundly than his peda-
gogue or any ex.'ternal constraint. 19 
In order to reconstruct the context for Socrates' exchange with Lysis, it may 
help to recall the pretext for this conversation. Hippothales had asked Socrates to 
exemplify a way of speaking to his beloved that will endear him to his beloved. 
Socrates did not promise to show Hippothales how a lover can engender the fond-
ness of his beloved but only how he needs to speak to his beloved20 in order to 
make him easier to catch. The series of questions Socrates puts to Lysis, then, are 
intended ostensibly to show Hippothales how to humble and check the beautiful 
boy rather than infusing him with pride and vainglory as Hippothales does through 
his lugubrious praise. In the dialogue's opening scene, Ctesippus recounts the 
ridiculous extremes and ignominious compromises to which Hippothales is prone 
in his manic pursuit of the beautiful boy. Socrates takes it as a rule of thumb that 
no hunter who makes his prey harder to catch can truly be called a good hunter. 
As exemplar to Hippothales, Socrates goes on the hunt and the Lysis dramatizes 
his unusual brand of huntsmanship. 21 
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Socrates begins unsettling Lysis and delivering the boy from his trust by ques-
tioning the love his parents have for him. This will require the subversion of the 
belief that being happy means being permitted to do whatever he desires. This 
common-sense view of happiness converges here with the common-sense view of 
freedom as doing whatever one wishes. It turns out, of course, that Lysis' parents 
do not let him do whatever he pleases. They do not let him take the reins of their 
chariots in the races, they do not let him whip the mules, they do not let him 
conduct himself to and from school, and at school still more masters rule over 
Lysis. Nor does his mother let Lysis play with her weaving implements. There-
fore, either Lysis must reach the conclusion that his parents do not love him, he is 
not free, and he is wholly unable to pursue his own happiness or else the common 
understanding of happiness and freedom must be raised to a philosophical level 
and re-examined. 
Now it happens that there are certain areas where Lysis is allowed to do as he 
wishes. These include the areas of reading, writing and playing his lyre. Lysis 
supposes. that he understands (epistamai) these disciplines and not the others 
(209c2-3). But of course he is still not free to defy all limits in the practice of these 
arts. He may have slightly greater liberty when writing, to put the letters in what-
ever order he desires, than he has when he is reading words already formed before 
him. Likewise, he may have some flexibility in the tightening or loosening of the 
strings of his lyre or in varying his manner of plucking it, but an intrinsic limit 
must still obtain in order to maintain a harmony of the strings. Lysis does not 
seem to notice these internal limits, supposing that once the external constraints 
are lifted, he will be able to pursue his desires and pleasures without limit. 
Step Two: Fanning the Flames of Desire 
Socrates appears to be awakening in Lysis the natural hwnan desire for "the 
more" (ta pleon) that Plato calls p/eonexia.22 It is here that Socrates begins to 
inflame the powerful reservoir of passions in Lysis. For insofar as Lysis overlooks 
the intrinsic harmony and order that function as a limit in reading, writing and 
music, he may abandon himself to the insatiable desire for more and more. Socrates 
arouses the boy's spiritedness (thumos) still further when he proclaims that on the 
very day that Lysis becomes knowledgeable, his father .will turn over all of his 
affairs to him. Not only will his father place Lysis in charge of his household; so 
will his neighbor, the Athenian people, and the Persian king. 
The hyperbolic promise Socrates holds out to Lysis is that when he acquires 
knowledge, his legitimate claim to authority will follow automatically. But the 
disClosure: }.;faking Boundaries 
Limits and Liberation in Plato's Lysis 29 
case of Socrates himself should provoke doubt that "the many" esteem knowl-
edgeable people for their usefulness and love them. What is even more peculiar is 
the subtle intimation that only the kind of knowledge that Socrates offers is likely 
to equip Lysis to fulfill his teeming desires. Yet the attentive reader of Plato will 
recall Socrates' profession of his inability to teach23 anyone anything. Such a reader 
will also wonder about the fact that, as the possessor of this knowledge himself, 
the redoubtable Socrates exhibits no desire for the kind of authority Lysis aspires 
to wield. 
Socrates embellishes the hyperbole by arguing that Lysis' rightful dominion 
will extend naturally from his father's household to his neighbor's, to Athens, and 
finally to the Persian empire. He clearly begs the question about the kinds of 
knowledge (tec/mQI) that are useful and about whether or not prudent knowledge 
alone is a sufficient condition to inspire strangers to turn over their affairs to Lysis. 
Furthermore, prudent knowledge (sophron) is exactly what Socrates claims to 
possess in the greatest proportion vis-a-vis other men. Plato's dialogues often 
show Socrates comparing himself to others who lack self-knowledge or modera-
tion, both of which are implied by the Greek concept of sophrosune. In Xenophon's 
Apology, Socrates is said to have called himself "the freest, the most just, and the 
most prudent (sophronesteron) of men. "24 This emphasis on prudence evokes 
perplexity about the eA1:ent to which Socrates' own self-sufficiency is linked to his 
prudent disdain for political office or material possessions. It would surely seem 
that his utter lack of concern for modes of political and material exchange places 
Socrates beyond the reach of corruption and bribery. He is not a slave to anyone 
not because he is a liberal man in the usual sense but precisely because he does not 
care for the material and political things by which men-and for classical Athens 
the gender specificity was significant-commonly appraise one another. His erotic 
method contravenes the exchange cycle by which one man places another in his 
debt through the bestowal of material or political rewards. Socrates does give 
something to those with whom he converses and his pupils surely incur a debt of 
gratitude. But the appreciative student may attempt to repay this immeasurable 
debt only through forms of honor or love and not with payments or gifts. 25 
In the present context, Socrates pretends to overlook the precarious trajectory 
of a techne that can be either combined with the excellences of character to pro-
duce good ends or divorced from these excellences and directed toward bad ends. 
It is a recurrent theme in Plato that the doctor who can heal is also the one who can 
harm most efficiently, albeit not in his capacity as doctor. This ethical ambiguity 
makes it likely that those in positions of authority will value someone they trust 
more than persons of greater competence and will tend to entrust their affairs to a 
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person in whom they have a prior trust. Yet Socrates sidesteps this difficulty 
entirely in asserting that he and Lysis would be permitted to replace the king's own 
son in supervising the food preparation. Pushing his examples to a comic ex-
treme, Socrates claims that they would be permitted to throw handfuls of salt into 
the king's sauce or to sprinkle ashes in the son's troubled eyes in order to heal his 
VlSIOn. 
By this point the reader will no doubt have experienced intermittent laughter 
at the lengths of Socrates' hyperbole and the innocent charm of Lysis' ebullient 
imagination. Taking this exchange seriously compels one to question what the 
argument presupposes here, viz. the trust that is a precondition for entrusting. 
Rather than simply begging the question of trust,26 however, Socrates proceeds 
from Lysis' implicit trust to a patent consideration of trust in these last two ex-
amples-at least for the reader. By hypothetically eliminating all extrinsic limits, 
Socrates brings Lysis face to face with his own deep-seated limit. 
Understandably, the impassioned Lysis could be carried away with excite-
ment over these intoxicating possibilities. Were Socrates to leave the matter here, 
it would appear that he has done more to propagate Lysis' pleonexic desire than to 
actuate his recognition of limits. Leading the discussion to the subject of the 
friend, though, interjects a kind of limit into the conversation, deflating Lysis' 
unbounded desire. For not only do relations with others cultivate an awareness of, 
and respect for, limits, thereby modulating the pleonexic side of spiritedness,27 but 
the way Socrates introduces the friend passes first through knowledge. 
Socrates claims that only knowledge renders one useful and free. 28 With re-
gard to those things about which we acquire prudence, Socrates insists that: 
everyone ... will entrust them to us; we will do in regard to these matters 
whatever we wish, and no one will voluntarily obstruct us. Rather, we 
ourselves shall be free in regard to them and rulers over others, and these 
things will be ours, for we shall profit from them. (210b2-c5; Bolotin, p. 
28) 
Socrates continues by insisting that if Lysis does not acquire good sense no one 
will entrust anything to him. He will not rule over others but will be subject to 
them. He will gain no profit but will instead be disenfranchised. From this he 
concludes for Lysis that if Lysis does not attain wisdom, he will be entirely use-
less. He will be loved, even by his parents, only insofar as he is useful. The 
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argument concludes that no one is a friend to anyone and no one loves anyone who 
is useless. 
Socrates is taking more and more for granted as his humbling ofLysis nears 
its climax. He interchanges prudence or "good sense" (phronesis), skill (techne) 
and wisdom (sophia); he frames Lysis' alternatives in stark, binary absolutes; he 
allows the common-sense understanding of freedom as doing whatever one de-
sires to stand; he emphasizes the profitable element of skill rather than the po.s~i­
bility that it may lead progressively to "good sense" and wisdom; he makes utility 
the basis of all friendship and love, even the parental love that seems most selfless 
of all; and, most noticeably, Socrates abandons an essential condition of trust he 
stipulated earlier. 
At 209c3-6, Socrates supplies the condition for the father to entrust 
(epitrepsein) the management of his household to Lysis. The father must be con-
vinced (egesetal) that his son's thinking is better than his own. Lysis' neighbor 
employs the same criterion as the father (209c8-d2). The Athenians need only to 
"perceive [aisthanontai] that you think capably" (209d2-4). The Persian king will 
want a demonstration (endeixaimetha) of their culinary talents before he will en-
trust his food preparation to Lysis and Socrates (209d5-e3). This same king is 
ready to turn over the care of his son to Socrates and Lysis if he assumes 
(hupolamban01) that they are skilled in the medical art (21 Oa2-5). When he gen-
eralizes from these examples to make his argument to Lysis at 21 Obff, Socrates 
omits any conditional term that would justify trust in the boy. He fails to include 
any condition that one who would entrust his affairs to Lysis be convinced, per-
ceive, receive a demonstration, or even suppose that Lysis pos.sesses a particular 
skill, much less the proper phronesis or a good ethical disposition. 
Step Three: The Humbling Knowledge of Limits . . 
The problem with knowledge is that it both transgresses and uncovers luruts. 
To become knowledgeable is to push back one's previous limits. Yet knowled~e 
simultaneously explicates limits that were heretofore wholly latent. Whe~ Lys~s 
becomes as skilled in other matters as he is in reading, writing and playmg his 
lyre, others may come to value his expertise in those areas. But knowledge ~ill 
also make Lysis aware of the natural boundaries that inhere in any art or skill. 
Socrates is willing to overlook all of the difficulties raised by his hyperbolic ar~­
ment to Lysis in order to isolate the problem oflimits and the seamless connection 
of limits to trust in the familiar. Through such isolation, the trust that has been 
previously presupposed is now set in relief so that it may become quite concrete 
and explicit for Lysis. With regard to knowledge, Socrates' approach suggests that 
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tee/me combined with phronesis may evolve into genuine wisdom, as Lysis be-
gins to embrace the whole of knowledge. 
The turn toward knowledge transfigures Lysis' focus from the perspective of a 
subjugated individual to a vantage-point from which limits can be conceived as 
immanent in the order of things. In this way, Plato reorients the investigation of 
limits. This process transports Lysis beyond the restricted viewpoint of the super-
intended individual, for whom all limits are taken to be a constraint. From a new 
vista Lysis is able to grasp that limits not only restrict him but produce his self-
understanding. Socrates shows Lysis how various limits combine to forge his 
identity. At the same time, Plato permits the reader to conceptualize broadly the 
way limits structure and demarcate the pliant forms character may take. 1brough 
this shift in perspective, Plato elucidates the manner in which limits as such give 
shape to the individual as a self-at once political, sexual, and philosophical. 
Yet, some boundaries may be more determinate and less malleable than oth-
ers. The limits that demarcate the individual as a self may not admit of the same 
degree of change as the limits that issue from ignorance. Boundaries like mortal· 
ity or those that delimit what is knowable may be less amenable to change than the 
kind of limits belonging to the individual. But they may sometimes be trans-
gressed. This may explain why Socrates begins by appearing to transgress estab· 
lished authority. 
Socrates completes the humbling of Lysis by telling him, in effect, that he has 
no right to think highly of himself inasmuch as. he is not yet thoughtful at all. He 
has already (208e8-209a5) led Lysis to the conclusion that he derives no benefit 
from his possessions, his noble rank, or his body. Presumably, this includes his 
good looks. In a formulation reminiscent of the way Socrates upbraids Meno, he 
tells Lysis that he is no better than a slave since he is able to do nothing he wants, 
rules over no one, and various hirelings are placed over him. 
The inflammatory aspect of Socrates' erotic method has given way to the con· 
comitant chastening of Lysis. Socrates targets Lysis' passivity and connects this 
passivity to his glaring lack of self-sufficiency. Lysis not only supposes that all 
limits constraint his freedom; he assumes that all limits are externally imposed 
upon him by others. The incisive questioning Socrates carries out is designed to 
produce a disruptive effect, one way or another, in his interlocutor. Lysis reacts 
positively to the provocation; he does not display anger or despair. He is not 
shamed or dishonored by the methodical antidote, although it must surely have 
been painful. Lysis offers a more thoughtful response in his second attempt to 
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explain why his parents entrust reading, writing, and music to him while forbid-
ding him to do the other things Socrates enumerates. Lysis explains: "I suppose .. 
.it's because I understand these things, but not those" (209c 1-2). He had first 
attempted to explain why so many people rule over him by saying "that's because 
I'm not yet of age, Socrates" (209a5-6). Socrates wastes no time in professing his 
doubt that this is the reason for the restrictions placed upon him. Lysis' more 
thoughtful response prompts Socrates to call hirri "you best [ ariste] of men." 
It is instructive to consider the way Lysis behaves during the balance of the 
conversation. In a dialogue that bears his name, Lysis is not the primary interlocu-
tor. Menexenus talks much more than Lysis does. As Menexenus returns to the 
conversation, Lysis urges Socrates to go through the same procedure with his ~om­
rade that had unsettled him. But Socrates exhorts Lysis to try to recall the steps of 
the regimen himself and to solicit help only ifhe cannot remember everything. He 
reconfirms that Lysis listened attentively throughout their conversation. In his 
tutorial way, Socrates encourages Lysis to become an active participant rather than 
remaining merely a passive object of adoration and pursuit. His method has a 
synergistic effect on the boy. After Socrates subdues him, Lysis becomes an ani-
mated auditor of Socrates' contest with Menexenus. He is so anxious to demon-
strate what he has learned that he blurts out the answer to a question Socrates has 
directed to Menexenus. His lack of self-restraint causes Lysis to blush with em-
barrassment at his own impropriety. 29 But this blush betokens a new eagerness in 
Lysis. With Socrates, however, Lysis is much more cautious at the beginning of 
their next exchange. In this second and final exchange with Socrates-a discus-
sion of the conflicting stories poets tell-Lysis demurely equivocates in his an-
swers to Socrates. He becomes more reticent as the dialogue progresses. Rather 
than being hostile, as Meno is, to the bewitching "torpedo-fish" Socrates, Lysis 
seems sobered by the disquieting experience he has undergone at Socrates' direc-
tion. 
Apparently, Lysis and Menexenus would rather stay with Socrates at the end 
of the dialogue than leave with their governors. With this ironic intimation, the 
Lysis depicts the complete reversal of roles between Socrates and his interlocu-
tors. The hunter becomes the hunted while the initial object of pursuit is set free to 
do some hunting of his own. Whereas the pederasts purport to teach virtue, wis-
dom, and truth in exchange for a little pleasure,31 Socrates shows himself to be the 
one from whom the boys can truly benefit. That Plato does not show Socrates 
consummating the sexual part of this exchange32 makes it easier to see what the 
boys get from Socrates than what Socrates gets from the boys. Though Socrates 
first had to pursue the boys-entering their schoolyard and seducing them in con-
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versa ti on, breaching and transforming their view of the world-one imagines that 
after their empowerment Socrates will be hounded by his new, knowledge-hungry 
pupils. 
The Lysis is one of several examples of this dramatic reversal. We see a 
parallel movement in the Channides. Likewise, Alcibiades' report in the Sympo-
sium of his attempt to ensnare Socrates reverses the temper of Socrates' approach 
to him in the first Alcibiades. In the Lysis, Socrates both wins Lysis' favor and 
supplants him as the object of adoration in the dialogue. What does Socrates give 
to boys like Lysis that makes this ugly, old man so enduringly attractive to the!Il? 
In the Lysis, Socrates triggers the combustion ofLysis' power, offering a mode 
of access to that power through his own, paradigmatic freedom and self-suffi-
ciency. He may even be encouraging Lysis to enrich himself from this potent 
dowry. It is no wonder that this self-sufficiency has emerged as the touchstone of 
Socrates' erotic method. Socrates' idiosyncratic self-mastery often gives rise to 
catalytic reactions in his interlocutors, provoking the discovery of untapped poten-
tial or unacknowledged conceit in them. Like knowledge, self-sufficiency is some-
thing Socrates can share without any consequent diminution of his own portion, 
something that cannot be said of other kinds of exchange. In fact, his empower-
ment of others may even intensify Socrates' own power. The incommensurability 
of his benefaction33 with the interlocutor's ability to repay it may provide the initial 
source of Socrates' power. But the more he measures his extraordinary conti-
nence, indomitability and self-sufficiency against that of others with whom he 
converses, the more disproportionately powerful, and less in need of anyone or 
anything, Socrates appears. 
The Lysis shows that Socrates considers his approach to be more akin to an 
act of seduction than to enervation or domination. In a seduction the other is 
mobilized subtly through an arousal that converts passivity into activity. The 
Socratic seduction gets the interlocutor to do something while making him think it 
was his idea in the first place. If self-sufficiency is the ultimate end of Socratic 
self-mastery, and if empowerment is the positive outcome of the way Socrates 
effects the reversal from hunter to hunted in the game of Eros he plays with Lysis, 
then neither would Socrates' erotic method perpetuate the endless cycle of one-
upmanship that characterizes other forms of exchange. The kind of self-rule Socrates 
shows Lysis navigates a middle course between ruling over others and being a 
slave to them.34 Other approaches may attenuate the power or constrain the free-
dom of the participants. But the alluring aphrodisia of Socrates' erotic method 
liberates rather than enslaves. 
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Endnotes 
1. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 12th Annual Conference 
of the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy, October 30, 1993, held at Binghamton 
University, Binghamton, NY. 
2. Which is precisely what he does at 505c-d where he tells Socrates to carry out 
the argument by himself. Callicles had previously professed his friendship and good-
will toward Socrates (see, for example, 485e and 486a). In tum, Socrates addresses 
Callicles as "friend" (499c) and begins his severest chastisement of Callicles' posi-
tion with the entreaty, "In the name of friendship ... " (SOOb). The performative con-
tradiction involved in Callicles' desire to dominate Socrates in argument at the ex-
pense of friendly relations gives the lie to his claim at 492b that only the strong man 
will be in a position to give gifts to his friends. Socrates concludes his refutation of 
Calli cl es by insisting that the strong (immoderate) man can be friend neither to men 
nor gods because such men exhibit no willingness to share. Without moderation, one 
is incapable of community and one who is not capable of community is incapable of 
friendship. Cf. Gorgias 507e. 
I am indebted to Roger Duncan's short but insightful discussion of philia in the 
Gorgias. Roger Duncan "Philia in the Gorgias." Apeiron, Vol. 8, May 1974: 23-25. 
Duncan shows that Callicles' desire to win the argument and dominate Socrates is in 
tension with the friendly tenor that initially frames their conversation but he does not 
develop the wider implications of this tension. His clues provoked me to consider the 
broader relation between philia and pleonexia in Plato. 
3. Charmides, the only man Xenophon shows Socrates advising to enter politi-
cal life, became one of the Thirty Tyrants. Alcibiades was brought up on charges of 
sullying the HemlS and he was widely regarded-by Thucydides and Xenophon, among 
others-as the reckless captain of Athens' demise. Eva C. Keuls explores the great 
mystery surrounding the castration of the Herms in Reign of the Phallus: Sexual 
Politics in Ancient Athens. 2nd ed. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985. 
See especially pp. 381-394. 
4. The possible exception may be the dialogue that most parallels the Lysis, viz. 
Alcibiades 1. Because the Lysis is the only dialogue in which Lysis appears, we 
cannot judge fully the effect Socrates has upon him. This interpretation eA1rapolates 
from the dramatic clues Plato gives us in this short conversation with the boy. After 
Socrates is through with him, Lysis remains attentive, even excited. (Cf. especially 
213dff.) Lysis is much more cautiously circumspect in his next exchange with Socrates, 
however, reflecting that he learned a lesson from their first exchange. He responds 
with an equivocal "perhaps" to Socrates' question about whether or not the poets tell 
the truth. For the rest of the dialogue, Lysis is somewhat laconic. Plato does indicate 
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various nods and assents on Lysis' part. At 213d3ff, Socrates tells us that Lysis blushed 
after blurting out his opinion and, at 222a6, that Lysis is silent. That Socrates ex-
pressly mentions Lysis' silence may be intended to indicate an attentive, participatory 
reticence. 
All passages from the Lysis cited in this paper ;ire from the Bolotin translation. 
David Bolotin Plato's Dialogue on Friendship Ithaca and London: Cornell University 
Press, 1979. 
5. It is not easy to position this self-knowledge within the terminology of episte-
mology. Plato does not really explain how, within the traditional categories applied 
to his theory of knowledge, the soul can have knowledge of itself. Even assuming a 
form of "soul", it is not easy to see how a particular soul recognizes itself. This 
difficulty suggests that the traditional categories are too narrow to encompass the· 
richness of Plato. Socrates is certainly concerned with the problem of self-knowl-
edge, taking up its relation to sophrosune at Charm ides J 64d.ff, invoking self-knowl-
edge as the essential condition for discriminating between what one knows and does 
not know at Charmides 167a, and raising the issue of self-knowledge again in the 
discussion of first and second order teclmai at Charmides J 69d-l 70a. Cf. also 
Alcibiades I l 29a and l 33c. 
In the Phaedrus, Socrates disparages abstract, theoretical knowledge and at-
tributes hubris to a lack of self-knowledge, saying: 
I myself have certainly no time for the business, and rn tell you why, my 
friend . I can't as yet 'know myself,' as the inscription at Delphi enjoins, and 
so long as that ignorance remains it seems to me ridiculous to inquire into 
extraneous matters. <;;onsequently I don't bother about such things, but ac-
cept the current beliefs about them, and direct my inquiries, as I have just 
said, rather to myself, to discover whether I really am a more complex 
creature and more puffed up with pride than Typhon, or a simpler, gentler 
being whom heaven has blessed with a quiet, un-Typhonic nature. By the 
way, isn't this the tree we were making for? (229efl) 
Plato Phaedrus Trans. R. Hackforth. Collected Dialogues of Plato Ed. Hamilton, 
Edith and Huntington Cairns. Bollingen Series, 71. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1989, p. 4 78. 
6. I am thinking especially of Sophocles' Oedipus Tyrannos and the tragic myo-
pia Oedipus displays toward himself. 
7. Autarkeia is one of the two necessary conditions Aristotle gives for happiness 
in Nicomachean Ethics 1. 7. He stipulates that the "final good must be a thing suffi-
cient in itself (teleion aga1'1011 autarkes einai dokei)." (Cf. NE 1097b9fl) Aristotle 
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continues immediately upon introducing this condition for happiness by saying that 
this does not imply a life in isolation because "man is by nature a political being." 
(epeide phusei politikon de anthropos). Liddell and Scott define autarkeia as "suffi-
ciency in oneself; independence." See Liddell, H.G. and Scott, R. A Lexicon Abridged 
from Liddell and Scott's Greek-English Lexicon Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986, 
(Impression of 1990) p. 116. 
The full pertinence of this self-sufficiency to Socrates will be developed through-
out this paper. Whereas freedom (eleutheria) is employed in the paper to signify the 
negative side of freedom, the "freedom from" (see note # 13), self-sufficiency con-
notes the positive side of freedom, the sense of not requiring anything to be imported 
from the outside, i.e. to be independent and to rule oneself. 
8. Lysis and Menexenus are probably the youngest interlocutors in any Platonic 
dialogue. They belong to the younger of two groups of boys that are assembled inside 
the newly-constructed Palestra and still have a pedagogue. Gregory Vlastos attributes 
to their extremely young age the unusual tenor of argumentation Socrates employs in 
this dialogue. Rather than really cross-examining Lysis, Socrates merely presents 
several alternatives (usually three) from which Lysis picks one. There are very few 
open-ended questions put to either boy in this dialogue. Their extreme youth should 
have the further effect of diminishing the reader's expectation of a mature account of 
friendship or love here. For a thorough discussion of the different qualities of Socratic 
elenchus see Vlastos "Socratic Elenchus " Ox'ord Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 1 
' ' ' './\ 
(1983): 27-58 and Ronald M. Polansky, "Professor Vlastos' Analysis of Socratic 
Elenchus," Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 3 (1985): 247-260. 
9. It was Hippothales' hubris that made him appear ridiculous to Socrates at the 
beginning of the dialogue. Socrates chastises Hippothales for not realizing that his 
praises of Lysis were, at bottom, praises of himself. When Socrates refers to himself 
as "ridiculous" near the end of the dialogue (223b,5) we must ask ourselves whether 
Socrates' hubris has led him to overstep appropriate boundaries in his approach to 
Lysis. 
Indeed, Socrates comes perilously close to the shaming kind of hubris in his 
exchange with Lysis. Athenian law prohibited certain kinds of shame, rage or assault 
against citizens. (Of course, since Lysis has not yet reached the age of majority, his 
inviolability as a citizen is not yet fully protected within the scope of the hubris laws.) 
If it can be shown that Socrates really shames Lysis by reducing him to the level of a 
slave, then this humbling will constitute a kind of hubris. If, however, Socrates does 
not enslave Lysis through his questioning, he will be vindicated. For an excellent 
discussion of the relationship of political, economic and sexual hierarchies in classi-
cal Athens, and a more detailed explication of the hubris laws, see David Halperin, 
"The Democratic Body: Prostitution and Citizenship in Classical Athens," in David 
M. Halperin One Hundred Years of Homosexuality and Other Essays on Greek Love 
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New York: Routledge, 1990: 88-112. See also, Mark Golden, "Slavery and Homo-
sexuality in Athens," Phoenix: 38 (1984 ): 308-324 and "Pais, 'Child' and 'Slave'," 
L'Antiquite Classique: 54 (1985): 91-104. Finally, see David Cohen, "Law, Society 
and Homosexuality in Classical Athens," Past and Present, 17 (1987): 3-21 . 
10. This confession occurs just after Socrates has presumed to show conclu-
sively that only the philosopher, who is neither wholly good nor wholly bad, can truly 
be called the friend. Socrates says: " .. .I rejoiced greatly myself, as if I were a hunter 
and had, to my satisfaction, what I had been hunting. But then some most strange 
suspicion came over me- from where, I don't know-that the things we had agreed 
to were not true ... " David Bolotin, Plato's Dialogue on Friendship. Ithaca and Lon-
don: Cornell University Press, 1979, p. 43. 
Socrates continues by saying that he is afraid that they have come across some 
false arguments about the friend , "false like boastful human beings" (Bolotin, p.44). 
Perhaps this is the kind of hubris of which Socrates knows he is guilty. He clearly 
seems to intimate to Lysis that he can give him the knowledge he needs to attain his 
aspirations. Paradoxically, those who spend time with Socrates seem to end up real-
izing that they no longer aspire to the same things they did before they met Socrates, 
unless they end up like Charmides or Alcibiades. Finally, one still has to decide how 
to interpret the mantic element of Socrates' character and his public claims to be 
unable to teach anybody anything. 
11. I would suggest that the title of this dialogue is carefully chosen for what it 
reveals about a critical aspect of Socrates' method. Lysis' name means "a setting free" 
or a "loosing," especially in the case of a prisoner. It suggests the kind of "loosing" 
that requires the active intervention of another, as we see, for example, in the Cave 
Allegory in Republic VII. Someone must first free the prisoners who are chained and 
constrained to look straight ahead. Lysis can also mean "a ransoming" or "a deliver-
ance from an oppressor" in the case of slaves. There are a host of compound words in 
Greek formed from the stem "lusi," a verb. The phrase "lysis kreion" means liquidat-
ing a debt and can be used to connote the power of releasing or loosing. Lusigamos 
means "dissolving a marriage"; lusikakos means eliminating evil; Lusimakos means 
"ending strife"; Lusipothos means to be "delivered from love"; and lusiponos means 
freeing one from toil. Lusiteleo means both to pay dues or tributes to another and 
"being useful". And Lusiphron connotes "setting free the mind." Plato seems to be 
playing with the three predominant senses of lusis as a "loosing," being useful and 
profiting. Cf. Liddell and Scott, p. 420. 
In his classic essay, "The Individual as an Object of Love in Plato," in Platonic 
Studies, Ed. Gregory Vlastos, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973: 3-11 , Pro-
fessor Gregory Vlastos argues that the connotation "being useful" is not to be under-
stood in the narrow sense and that the beloved's utility is not to the Jover but is 
indiscriminate, i.e. being useful as such in the sense of "good-producing." This leads 
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Vlastos to claim that the individual is not the object of love in Plato at all but, as he 
shows from the ladder of love in Diotima's speech in the Symposium, only a vehicle 
for pure love. While this traditional reading seems highly problematic, for reasons 
that would require another essay to enumerate, it does suggest why, in the Lysis, 
Socrates weaves together being useful and being loved. 
12. I am indebted to David O'Connor of Notre Dame for his incisive remarks in 
his lecture, "Socrates and the Gift," presented at the 12th Annual conference of the 
Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy, October 30, 1993, at Binghamton University, 
in Binghamton, NY. I have integrated many of Professor O'Connor's insights into my 
thinking about Socrates and followed up several clues he offered in his talk. I wish to 
acknowledge a special debt to him for inspiring me to read Xenophon differently. 
13. Lidell and Scott indicate an analogy. The Latin word liberalis is to eleutherios 
as fiber is to eleutheros. Eleutherios, like liberalis, describes the way one acts when 
one is free. It also means liberal, freely-giving, the way one who is free deals. The 
sense of freedom signified here is primarily negative, the freedom from constraint, 
need, bondage, blame, etc. The word eleutheron means "a setting free" as the word 
lusis does. Cf. Liddell and Scott, p. 215. 
14. There is a marked suspension of the everyday which frames this dialogue. It 
takes place during a religious hiatus, the festival of the Hermea, with the various ages 
intermingled, the boys in their holiday dress, and the pedagogues off somewhere 
drinking. The dialogue opens with striking threshold imagery, which not only alerts 
us to the suspension of everyday practices but also to the issue of boundaries or limits 
that it thematizes. Socrates is between the Academy and the Lyceum and just along 
the city wall when he is met by Hippothales and Ctesippus. He is neither collared, 
like he is at the beginning of Republic, nor forced by any internal necessity to enter 
the place and action of the Lysis. The newly-built wrestling school in which the 
dialogue transpires evokes the image of a bounded conflict that is a Platonic dia-
logue. The reader is invited to reflect on what is being bracketed or suspended as the 
dialogue unfolds. Perhaps it is Eros itself that is being bracketed during the middle 
sections of the dialogue, only to reinsert itself near the end. In any case, it would 
seem that there is as much hypothetical in the setting of the dialogue as there is in 
Socrates' tactics toward Lysis. 
15. See note #18. 
16. We could add to this list Lysis' trust in the rewards that he expects to follow 
automatically upon his noble rank and exceptional beauty. At one point in their first 
exchange, at 209a, Socrates seems to be telling Lysis that he has no right to prance 
and preen, holding his body out as a kind of prize, since he does not possess the 
requisite autonomy over his body. Lysis is still shepherded around by others and 
since he does not rule over his own body, his beauty is of no use to him. 
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17. The question which inaugurates Socrates' contest with Menexenus typifies 
the sophistical kind of question one finds in eristic argumentation. The best example 
of this kind of argument is found in Plato's Euthydemus. Moreover, the sharp distinc-
tion between lover and beloved is a quasi-technical verbiage common to discussions 
about pederasty, as can be seen in the speeches of Phaedrus, Pausanias, Eryximachus, 
and Agathon in Plato's Symposium. The inaugural question of the discussion with 
Menexenus is related to the questions that propel the Plzaedn1s, such as the question 
regarding whether the lover should better become involved with a beloved who does 
not love him in return or with one who does. Cf. the Lysis 212b ("When someone 
loves someone, which one becomes a friend of the other, the one who loves of the 
loved or the loved one of the lover?") The phrasing of this question in the Lysis goes 
straight to the heart of the problems posed by asymmetrical relationships which are, 
after all, more common than the reciprocal and equal type. It is noticeable that in 
Aristotle's treatments of friendship (Nicomachean Ethics VIII-IX; Eudemian Ethics 
VII-VIII) there is far more discussion of the friendships based upon utility and plea-
sure than of those rare friendships of character. In a society where only propertied, 
free-born, male, Athenian adults were afforded citizenship, it is easy to see that rela-
tionships with wives, slaves, resident aliens, and children will never be truly recipro-
cal or equal. 
18. The act of "entrusting" will be critical to the Socratic arousal in the first 
exchange with Lysis. The notion that various authorities will "turn over" or entrust 
their affairs to Lysis is the incendiary device Socrates employs to inflame Lysis' pas-
sions, as we will see below. In all, Plato seems to be adumbrating three levels of 
trust: (1) a wholly latent level of trust, i.e. the predisposition toward or reliance upon 
the familiar that conditions the second level of trust.; (2) the overt, reflective trust 
one has in things or people; and (3) placing one's affairs in the hands of another. In 
the traditional schema of the divided line that Socrates sketches in Republic VI, the 
first and second levels correspond roughly to pistis, in the realm of doxa. It is impor-
tant to note that Socrates' approach to Lysis accomplishes only the initial "turning-
around" that is the impetus toward knowledge. The levels of pistis and the relation of 
pistis, epitrepsein and doxa need to be examined in greater detail. In brief, there is 
discernible in the Lysis a level of trust or belief that can be explicated but there is 
also a level that is so closely tied to one's character that it is more akin to a "predispo-
sition" than a belief that is grasped as being a belief. 
19. It is noteworthy that there are, for Plato, other kinds of overt trust besides the 
trust in others. Plato often focuses upon instances where such overt trust is mis-
placed-in rulers (Gorgias 525d-526b), arguments (Phaedo 89d-e), names (Cratylus 
440a-d), and pleasures (Philebus 67b-c}-and there is assuredly a genuine kind of 
trust that results from deliberation and practical wisdom. This can be trust in others 
or in oneself. 
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20. In fact, though , he does show this in his own, deceptively philosophical, 
way. His immediate reply to Hippothales' request is: "It's not easy to say." Cf. The 
Lysis 206c4. 
21 . One of several things that make Socrates an unusual hunter is that instead of 
"capturing" his prey through the hunt, Socrates sets loose the prey. Whereas the 
lovesick troubadour, Hippothales, makes Lysis harder to catch through his relentless 
flattery, the way Socrates "catches" the boy paradoxically liberates him at the .same 
time. 
22. The clearest argumentation about this aspect of natural human desi~e is, of 
course, Glaucon's speech in Republic II. 
23. This is, of course, ironic. Socrates does not teach like the Sophists claim to 
do, and I would argue that this means further that he does not teach much that is 
formulaic or doctrinaire, but he does teach. Sometimes, as in the Meno, his failure to 
teach is not a failure to try. Meno may not be teachable but Lysis surely is. 
24. Cf. Xenophon, Apology, Line 15. 
25. It may still turn out that Socrates values his enhanced or intensified self-
sufiiciency much more than these acknowledgments. The word "gift" (dora) in Greek 
is closely tied to bribery or a "payoff." Aristotle takes up the question concerning 
how one can repay someone who teaches us philosophy at Nicomachean Ethics 
1164a34-1164b5. Aristotle writes: "And so too, it seems, should one make a return to 
those with whom one has studied philosophy; for their worth cannot be measured 
against money, and they can get no honor which will balance their services, but still 
it is perhaps enough, as it is with the gods and with one's parents, to give them what 
one can." 
26. As Bolotin, in his interpretive essay on the Lysis, claims he does. Bolotin 
remarks that the youth of Socrates' interlocutors in the Lysis helps "to explain what 
might otherwise be a serious omission from the dialogue .... " In particular, the Lysis 
contains no mention of trust (pistis). See Bolotin, Plato's Dialogue on Friendship, 
pp. 67-68. Bolotin contends that Eros "aims at the now" and argues from this premise 
that trust ultimately turns on the promise to remain alive forever which is, of course, 
impossible. This analysis seems to misconstrue the respective temporal dimension of 
both trust and Eros. Eros is a striving for what one has not or is not at present, i.e. that 
which one is endees about. This "not-yet" at which Eros "aims" renders the desire 
futural, even if the desire contains within it the anticipation of fulfillment. 
Trust seems to have the past as its predominant temporal modality. Trust is 
primarily for the familiar and, as I have argued, what is most familiar is that upon 
which one fundamentally relies. This is why trust is an obstacle to change; it roots 
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one to the past and to the taken-for-granted. My argument is that Plato, by seeming to 
beg the question, forces us to think about the implicit and overt levels of trust that 
subtend entrusting. 
27. The relation between pleonexia and philia in Plato is one that needs to be 
developed further. The Gorgias may provide the clearest indication that Plato consid-
ers these to be two possible directions of spiritedness: one which respects boundaries 
and recognizes limits as arising from the natural human desire for sociality and the 
other which oversteps all limits and ignores boundaries out of the natural human 
desire for ta pleon. Roger Duncan brings out this connection without developing it 
fully. See note #2. The Lysis contains an undeveloped counterweight to this side of 
thumos in its presentation of philia as involving the recognition of necessary limits. 
28. Here again Plato is playing with the ambiguity of the Greek words derived 
from lusi and lusis. (For example, "To be useful" and "to be set free" are two primary 
senses of the word lusiteleo.) 
29. Plato employs the phenomenon of blushing at critical junctures in many 
dialogues. Cf. Charmides 158c, Protagoras 312a, Euthydemus 275d, 297a, and, 
most famously, at Republic 350c. He sometimes uses the blush in a figure of speech 
to signify shame, such as at Gorgias 522c, Phaedrus 243d and 255a, Apology J7b, 
Symposium 217e, Republic 566c and 606c, Laws 819d, 819e, and 820b. In the Lysis, 
he invokes a blush on three occasions: 204bff, 204c, and, in the present context, at 
213d. 
30. This is how Meno describes Socrates' method, charging that he makes any-
one who comes .close to him feel numb. Cf. the Meno 80aff. 
31. There are other justifications for the practice of pederasty, including the 
protection of the beloved by the lover, an initiatory role perfonned by the lover, and 
so on. The first three speeches in Plato's Symposium provide a good overview of the 
contemporary, Athenian arguments for the practice. 
32. Socrates makes plain the paradox of pederasty: how can one justify an ex-
change relation, wherein the older man provides wisdom to his young lover in return 
for sex, when the young boy, who is supposed to lack the wisdom he hopes to receive 
from the older man, must display the more noble aim in the relation? For an elabora-
tion of this paradox, see Allan Bloom's discussion of Pausanias' speech in his Love 
and Friendship, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993), pp. 466-468. 
33. Cf. Bloom, Love and Friendship, p. 539ff. 
34. The political problem for Lysis will be the problem facing all Athenian citi-
zens. It does not concern the casting off of any particular yoke but rather how to 
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behave as a continent individual in the absence of external constraints. More pre-
cisely, given that the citizen is a propertied, male Athenian, the most important ques-
tion of limits may be the one regarding the citizen's self-restraint vis-a-vis wives, 
concubines (hetera), prostitutes (porna), slaves and, most problematically, young boys. 
The Lysis may concern how one is to behave on the threshold of the law, in the 
margins of what is explicitly proscribed. Practices involving young boys are a par-
ticular problem for Athenian citizens, as Michel Foucault points out, because these 
boys are vulnerable disproportionately to the older men and yet boys like Lysis will 
soon grow up to be their equal. See Foucault The Use of Pleasure Trans. Robert 
Hurley. New York: Random House, 1986. Also see David Halperin's excellent essay, 
"The Democratic Body: Prostitution and Citizenship in Classical Athens" (see note 
#9); John J. Winkler's illuminating essay, "Laying Down the Law: The Oversight of 
Men's Sexual Behavior in Classical Athens," in Winkler The Constraints of Desire: 
Anthropology and Gender in Ancient Greece New York: Routledge, 1990: 45-70; and 
two pathbreaking books by Sir Kenneth J . Dover: Greek Popular Morality in the 
Time of Plato and Aristotle (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974) and 
Greek Homosexuality (London: Duckworth, 1978). 
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